the startling changes in the U.S.S.R. during the Gorbachev era, it is still difficult to study Soviet policy-making and policy-makers' attitudes directly. I employ content analysis of Soviet political journals as a surrogate for the public-opinion and case-study data which are available on the U.S. side. In short, I am presenting my data as preliminary evidence of what I believe to be important differences between U.S. and Soviet approaches to international organizations (IOs) .
As the framework for my discussion, I (Krasner 1985: 71) . The European Economic Community's collective gross national product now exceeds that of the U.S. (Schmeisser 1988 (Krasner 1985: 299) . The Kassebaum Amendment, passed by the Congress in 1985, stipulated that the American share would unilaterally be reduced to 20 percent until the UN reformed its budget-making procedures. The United Nations' scheme for assessing the budget shares which members are expected to contribute is implicitly based on a linkage of states' power (measured by GNP) with their consumption of the collective goods provided by the UN. In other words, &dquo;the main criterion for capacity to pay has always been gross national income&dquo; (Franck 1985: 256 (Lister 1990: 223 (Luck and Gati 1988: 23) . (Petrovsky 1980: 11-12 Figure 1 shows a clockwise movement from minimum to maximum centrality of the stakes, as a function of changes in the tangibility and symmetry of given issue-areas. Establishing the degree of an issuearea's symmetry and tangibility also should allow for prediction of the nature of the attendant policy process, the possibilities for which are arranged in a clockwise continuum: from interaction to distribution, regulation, redistribution, and finally to protection.
The task for an issue-area model of the politics of superpower policy-making on issues concerning international institutions is first to address the questions concerning the attributes of an issue-area, i.e., tangibility of stakes and symmetry of impact. Then the model will be able to predict the expected policy process and provide a sense of how that process can best be studied. The supposed virtue of employing the issue-area paradigm is that of developing a richer, more subtle analysis than is possible &dquo; ... [with] a conception of foreign policy conducted by a rational, unitary decision-maker&dquo; (Zimmerman, 1973: 1209). 
ISSUE-AREA ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET CASE
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the official Soviet view on interdependence in general and the UN in specific has been enthusiastic. Mikhail Gorbachev (1987) (Shakhnazarov 1988 and Bovin 1988) . Given (Shenfield 1987: 62) .
Concerning the general question of closer economic ties with the West, three different strands of thought exist. In 1987 a two-part review article, in itself a sign of the liveliness of the interdependence debate, outlined three schools of thought regarding the world economy. The broad interpretation depicts a truly global economy which envelops all national economies and links them together by means of the international division of labor. The narrow approach sees the world economy as a system based on economic relations between countries, or even between the separate socialist and capitalist world economies. The third, or &dquo;intermediate&dquo; approach, seeks a middle way between the two extremes (Shishkov 1987: 75 (Hough 1988: 76) .
Gorbachev needs his pro-reform constituency both as a base of political power and as a resource to make the economic restructuring work. Given this context, theoretical debates over interdependence have acquired political importance. Snyder notes that the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Anatolii Aleksandrov, was fired after warning that an &dquo;import plague&dquo; was retarding the growth of Soviet technology and thus endangering national security (1987: 111; also see Clemens 1990: 178) . This episode implies that the domestic impact of interdependence issues in the U.S.S.R. is not symmetrical.
I conclude that given an issue-area characterized by nonexclusively tangible goods and asymmetrical domestic impact, the Zimmerman paradigm would place it in quadrant IV of Figure 1 and expect a redistributive policy process to accompany the issue-area of international institutions. The issue-area of global interdependence and international institutions evidently has a redistributive effect on the Soviet polity, draining political power from the conservatives and delivering it to the Gorbachev constituency. The 26, 1985) .
When the focus shifts from the U.S. public to the government, the analysis becomes more complicated. One observer has stated that &dquo;an anti-UN mood now runs through virtually the entire policy-making community, Democratic and Republican, and to a large extent the journalistic and scholarly communities as well&dquo; (Johansen 1986: 614) . However, a brief review of the policy process concerning the U.S.
withdrawal from UNESCO indicates that the existence of anti-UN sentiment is not equivalent to an anti-UN consensus. A careful study of U.S. elite and public opinion on the UN concludes, &dquo; ... simultaneous support for and criticism of the UN is common to a variety of 'elites' ... &dquo; (Martin 1983: 300 
